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Abstract
This question is raised by Cason, Friedman and Hopkins (CFH, 2012) af-
ter they firstly found and indexed quantitatively the cycles in a continuous
time experiment. To answer this question, we use the data from standard
RPS experiment. Our experiments are of the traditional setting — in each
of repeated rounds, the subjects are paired with random matching, using
pure strategy and must choose simultaneously, and after each round, each
subject obtains only private information. This economics environment is a
decartelized and low-information one.
Using the cycle rotation indexes (CRI, developed by CFH) method, we
find, the cycles not only exist but also persist in our experiment. Meanwhile,
the cycles’ direction are consistent with ’standard’ learning models. That is
the answer to the CHF question: Cycles do not dissipate in the simultane-
ously choose game.
In addtion, we discuss three questions (1) why significant cycles are un-
easy to be obtained in traditional setting experiments; (2) why CRI can be
an iconic indexing-method for ’standard’ evolution dynamics; and (3) where
more cycles could be expected.
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1. Introduction
Cycle is a significant social evolution phenomenon. Evolutionary game
theory predicts cyclic behavior, but such behavior has rarely been reported
clearly in previous experimental economics work [3, 8]. Only quite recently,
in a continuous time laboratory environment, Cason, Friedman and Hopkins
(CFH) found clear persistent cycles in population strategy space. Then, CFH
asked a question: Do cycles dissipate when subjects must choose simultane-
ously? [3]
The question can be simplified and specified as: in traditional setting
experimental games [6, 4, 9], does the cycle exist and persist? According
to our experimental data and the method of CFH’s cycle rotation index
(CRI) [3], Our results show that, at least in a traditional setting Rock-Paper-
Scissors (RPS) game in which the subjects must choose simultaneously, the
cycles exist, persist and do not dissipate.
In this letter, we introduce the traditional setting standard RPS experi-
ment and the CRI method at first; Then we report the cycles and the support
materials; discussion and summary last.
2. A traditional setting experiment
In RPS game, rock (R) beats scissors (S) which beats paper (P ) which
beats rock. If the payoff matrix is Figure 1(Left), the game is a standard
RPS [10, 8]. We use this game in our experiments to test the cycles’ existence
or dissipations. We use this game for two reasons. (1) It is the simplest; (2)
In replicator dynamic, the real part of the eigenvalues of this game is 0 and
the endless cycles are expected.
Our laboratory experiment is of the traditional setting [6, 4, 9, 12, 2]. In
each round, every player must choose one of (R,P, S). One will get 2 points
if win, 1 for tie and 0 for loss. In each of the 12 sessions2, 6 subjects play
the game anonymously over 300 rounds with random matching. Only after
all subjects make (privately) their own decisions, the private information
(only she and her opponent’s strategies and payoffs) of this round are fed
back privately. In such a game setting, the subjects are controlled to choose
simultaneously.
2Total 72 student subjects from Zhejiang University involve in the 12 game sessions
and on average, each earns 50 RMB in 1.5 to 2 hours.
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For a given round (t) in this game, the social state x(t) is in (and only in)
one of the discrete 28 states triagle [8] (Figure 1, Right). Along rounds, the
state should transit and form a trajectory [3, 2] in which cycle is expected
by many ’standard’ models [10, 3].
3. Cycle Rotation Indexes
CRI (Cycle Rotation Indexes) is developed by CHF [3]. To calculate this
index, they first constructed a line segment in the projection of the simplex
into the two-dimensional plane between the Nash equilibrium and the simplex
edge, illustrated as the line segment S in Figure 1. This line segment S serves
as a Poincare section for cycle counting.
Specifically, in a given time interval [t0, t1], how many times (CCT, coun-
terclockwise transits, C+t0,t1) the social state crosses S from left to right and
how many times (CT, clockwise transits, C−t0,t1) from right to left can be
counted. Then, the cycle rotation indexes (denoted as θ) can be written in
formula as
θ =
C+ − C−
C+ + C−
. (1)
Thus the CRI θ values near 1 (-1) indicate consistent counter-clockwise
(clockwise) cycles, and values near 0 indicate no consistent cycles. We use
the subscript (t0, t1) to denote the time interval of the observation. For ex-
ample, θt0,t1 is the result of θ calculated in the trajectory x(t) from round-t0
to round-t1 including t1-t0 times transitions in the strategy space. Mathe-
matically, CRI is of time odd (θt1,t2=-θt2,t1).
In this way, the question — whether cycles dissipate — becomes testable:
the null hypothesis is Hd0 : θ = 0. If H
d
0 can not be rejected in the data,
cycles do dissipate; Alternatively, cycles do not dissipate.
4. Results
We collect data from the 12 sessions each having 300 rounds. Fig-
ure 2 is an evolution trajectory. Mean observation of the RPS, denoted as
x¯1,300, is (0.357,0.321,0.322) which is close to Nash equilibrium NE (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
Meanwhile, the observed distributions satisfied the distributions predicted by
multi-normal distributions (the principle of Maximun entropy [15]) 3. This
3χ2 goodness fit testing, p < 0.05 in the 12 sessions, respectively.
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results are similar to the results called as the cycles amplitudes in [3] and
called as the distances from the center in [8].
Mainly we use CRI to report Rotation strength and direction, then the
evidences of the cycles’ existence and the persistence. In this report, we set
the the segment from NE to the low edge of the triangle as the Poincare
section4.
Result-1 To estimate the strength of the rotations, we calculate accu-
mulated rotation R1,t1 (R1,t1 := C
+
1,t1
-C−1,t1) and θ1,t1 of each session. The R1,t1
results of the 12 sessions are exhibited in Figure 2 (Right). The θ1,t1 is in
dash line in Figure 3 (Right). In the 12 samples, R¯1,300=8.50±2.17 (> 3σ)
and θ¯1,300=0.17±0.04 (> 4σ).
Result-2 To estimate the existence of the cycles, we use C±1,300 and θ1,300
(2-4 columns in Table. 1). Statistical results are (1) Hd0 : θ1,300=0 can be
rejected (p = 0.016 < 0.05, t-test, two-tailed, d.f.=11). Meanwhile, Ha:
θ¯1,300 <0 can be rejected (p=0.0083, t-test, one-tailed, d.f.=11). (2) equal
hypothesis (the two samples paired t-test of the 12 paired C+ and C−) can
also be rejected (p = 0.017 < 0.05, t-test, two-tailed, d.f.=11). So, the
dissipation of cycles in the data can be rejected; Alternatively, the cycles
exist.
Result-3 To estimate the persistence of the cycles, we use the p-values
(1) from t-test of Hd0 : θ=0; The results are shown in Figure 3 (Left) and
Table. 1; (2) from Hd0 : θ1,t1=0, the p-values are shown in Figure 3 (Right)
as a function of t1. The p-values are below 0.05 when rounds t >100. So, in
the game, the persistence of the cycles is supported by the data.
Result-4 For cycles’ direction, we use the materials in Result-2. θ¯1,300 > 0
means the cycles are of counter-clock-wise, which meets the expectations of
evolution dynamics (see Figure 4).
According to the sub-results above, in summary, the hypothesis of cycle
dissipation (Hd0 ) can be rejected (at least at 3σ level).
5. Discussion
In a standard RPS experiment with traditional setting — multi-subjects,
randomly paired, multi-rounds repeated, each subject using pure strategy
4 For simple, the segment in Figure 1(Right) is shifted (to left-down in 10−3) slightly
and does not pass though any of the 28-state.
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Figure 1: (Left) Payoff Matrix of standard RPS Game. (Middle) Social state space of the
Game. Each of the 28 dots denotes an observable states. The state denoted as (a, b) is the
state in which proportion of the R (P ) strategy in the population is a (b). The segment
S is the Poincare section for C± counting. NE appears as the reference is the centroid of
the simplex at (1
3
, 1
3
) in the game.
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Figure 2: (Left) Trajectory. Data from the 1st experimental session. The vertical axis
represents round (t) from 1-st to 50-th. (Right) Accumulated rotation R1,t1 (:= C
+
1,t1
-
C−1,t1) of the 12 sessions.
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Figure 3: The p-values of t-test for CRI (θ) with Hd0 : θ=0. (Left) For different sample
time interval (100 and 150, refer to Table 1); (Right) Increasing t1 for θ1,t1 testing as t1
= 5, 10, 15, ..., 300 (in solid) and the observed θ1,t1 (in dash).
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Table 1: CRI (θ) in the standard RPS game
Session C+ C− θ1,300 θ1,100 θ101,200 θ201,300 θ1,150 θ151,300
1 17 28 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.24
2 16 25 0.22 0.08 0.38 0.14 0.22 0.22
3 24 41 0.26 -0.07 0.39 0.33 0.2 0.3
4 16 27 0.26 0.20 0.38 0.14 0.43 0.17
5 25 22 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14 0.07 -0.2 0.09
6 13 25 0.32 0.20 0.29 0.38 0.11 0.50
7 22 45 0.34 0.18 0.48 0.33 0.33 0.35
8 15 27 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.14 0.33 0.24
9 20 20 0.00 -0.38 0.13 0.27 -0.17 0.25
10 26 31 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.00
11 26 26 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.09
12 23 28 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.25 0.07 0.13
Mean 20.25 28.75 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.22
S.E. 1.35 2.1 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04
and making decision simultaneously with limited information [6, 4, 9, 12, 2],
our answer to the question is: the cycles do not dissipate.
We analyze the three investigations (CFH [3] and this letter) by answering
two questions (1) why CRI is important; (2) why the cycle is uneasy to be
detected in traditional setting? (3) where more cycles could be expected?
5.1. Why CRI is important
Cycle is a significant social evolution phenomenon and is seeked for long
in experimental games [2, 6, 1]. With CRI [3], the cycle can be indexed
quantitatively. The importance can be interpreted briefly as following.
There are many ’standard’ evolution dynamics, e.g., replicator dynamics
(RD), logit dynamics (and other smoothed best reply dynamics), Brown-von
Neauman-Nash dynamics (BNND) and so on [10]. The predictions from the
dynamics differ and is rarely tested by experiment quantitatively. CRI can
serve for this aim. Using CRI, the models can be testable experimentally
now. For example, Figure 4 explains a probable way using CRI method to
distinguish the two models, RD and BNND, to see who meets standard RPS
experiments better.
The variable of CRI is time odd (θt1,t2=-θt2,t1). Meanwhile, the mean
observation (x¯t1,t2=x¯t2,t1) is time even. Time even (odd) means the observable
should be invariant (opposite) under time reversal transformation. CRI can
capture the evolution probability current in the Poincare section in long run
view. In experimental game data, similar observable e.g. velocity field [14]
[16] and angular momentum [13] are also time odd and also indicate the
existence of dynamics pattern, but the methods seem less straightforward.
The consistence of the methods needs further investigations. We believe the
6
L R
R
P S
L R
R
P S
Figure 4: Evaluating dynamics models with CRI in standard RPS game. The counter-
clock-wise cycles prediction using Dynamo [11] of RD and BNND. L and R are of the
Poincare sections. For the two θ-values in L and R, RD predicts equal but BNND unequal.
So, RD and BNND can be competitive and testable with CRI.
CRI could be a variable, as important as the experimental mean observation
x¯ for testing classical equilibrium theorems, for evolution theorems testing.
5.2. Why the cycles are uneasy to be detected in traditional setting RPS game
Cycles are uneasy to be detected [1]. What is the reason? Besides the CRI
method, we suggest that the sample size (number of the rounds and sessions)
could be the main reason. According to the result-3 and Figure 3(Right)
from our data, it can be noticed that CRI θ1,t1 > 0 could be significant only
when t1 > 150.
These mean that, to obtain cycles in the RPS game, larger numbers
of the experimental rounds are necessary. In Z-Tree[5]-like softwares using
experiments, the number of rounds usually is less than 150 (e.g. [6]), from
which to detect cycles should be uneasy.
In economics, as suggested by Hayek [7], one of the most interesting
phenomena is that, even though everyone has only limited and localized
information, global social order can form. Traditional setting game is in the
decentralized economics environment. The experimental finding of the cycles
in the traditional setting game suggests that the dynamics orders — cycles
— exist in laboratory even though long time is needed.
5.3. Where more cycles could be expected
Thanks to the wide parameters of the CFH’s experiments, we can begin to
compare cycles in variety environments. For the existence of cycles, a three
dimensional (information, strategy and time) analysis is demonstrated in
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Table 2 in which CHF, HSNG and WX presents the experiments reports [3],
[8] and this letter. The results indicate that none of the three dimensions
could be a unique necessary condition for the existence of cycles.
There are two straightforward puzzles when compare the two reports [3,
8]. (1) In the standard (called as neutral in [8]) RPS games, why no cycles
is reported in the entire information [8]? But the cycles exist in our limited
information condition. (2) The Bad-RPS games in [8] is exactly same as
the CHF’s Ua-DP (see Table 2), why the Bad-RPS reports no evidence of
cycles? Even more, extended questions can be, e.g., can cycles be found out
in mixed strategy 2×2 games? The cyclic velocity vectors field obtained in
the experimental coyness and Philandering games [14] strongly suggests the
existence of the cycles in 2×2 games.
Table 2: When cycles exist in RPS-like games
Game Info. Strategy Time Cycles
Entire(+) Pure(+) Continue(+) Exist(+)
Stable Private(-) Mixed(-) Discrete(-) Dissipate(-)
HSNG (G) S + + -
HSNG (N) N + + -
HSNG (B) U + + -
CHF (C) S + - + +
CHF (C) U + - + +
CHF (DM) S + - - -
CHF (DP) S + + - -
CHF (DM) U + - - +
CHF (DP) U + + - +
XW N - + - +
Column-2: The stability of the dynamics includes 3 conditions: stable(S),
neutral(N) and unstable(U). Column-3 to 5 are the three dimensions: (1)
Information provided to subjects in game. It includes two conditions: the entire
population’s (+) or only the private (-). (2) Options of strategy, pure (+) or
mixed (-), in the (R,P,S) strategy set. (3) Option of the time for decision making,
continuous (+) or discrete (-). Column-6: existence of cycle, yes (+) and no (-).
5.4. Summary
In the traditional setting experiments where subjects must choose simul-
taneously with limited information, we find, the cycles do not dissipate. This
is our answer to the CHF’s question [3]. We wish this report could serve as
a supplement for the CHF’s remarkable indexing of cycles. All these state
that there is much more to be learned about cycling ! 5
5We thanks Ken Binmore for the suggestions. Thanks also to Wang Shuang for the
English writing corrections. Any error belongs to our own.
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